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It is not yet well understood how we become conscious of the presence of other
people as being other subjects in their own right. Developmental and phenomenological
approaches are converging on a relational hypothesis: my perception of a “you” is
primarily constituted by another subject’s attention being directed toward “me.” This is
particularly the case when my body is being physically explored in an intentional manner.
We set out to characterize the sensorimotor signature of the transition to being aware of
the other by re-analyzing time series of embodied interactions between pairs of adults
(recorded during a “perceptual crossing” experiment). Measures of turn-taking and
movement synchrony were used to quantify social coordination, and transfer entropy
was used to quantify direction of influence. We found that the transition leading to one’s
conscious perception of the other’s presence was indeed characterized by a significant
increase in one’s passive reception of the other’s tactile stimulations. Unexpectedly,
one’s clear experience of such passive touch was consistently followed by a switch
to active touching of the other, while the other correspondingly became more passive,
which suggests that this intersubjective experience was reciprocally co-regulated by
both participants.
Keywords: embodied cognition, social interaction, intersubjectivity, agency detection, direct perception
INTRODUCTION
There is growing acceptance that humans develop social awareness much earlier than had long
been assumed, including suggestions of a capacity for false belief understanding even in the case of
preverbal infants (Baillargeon et al., 2010). Moreover, there is compelling evidence for the ability
to recognize and respond to another’s presence appropriately even in the first months after birth
(Reddy, 2008). In order to account for these findings it is necessary to expand the explanatory
framework that has traditionally been employed by developmental psychology and social cognition
research (Hutto et al., 2011). The root developmental form of social understanding is starting to
be conceived as more interactive and perceptual than just detached and cognitive. For example,
before infants can begin to theorize about another person’s minds from a third-person perspective,
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or to imagine what it is like to be them from a first-person
perspective, they arguably can already experience another’s
presence from the second-person perspective, that is, in the
context of mutual engagement (Reddy and Morris, 2004). On this
expanded view, the classic mechanisms of social cognition build
on and are preceded by embodied forms of social understanding,
such as those realized by neural resonance in motor areas
(Gallese, 2007) and by the dynamics and experience of social
coordination itself (Froese and Gallagher, 2012). However,
although the “higher-level” cognitive capacities develop on the
basis of the “lower-level” embodied capacities, they do not
replace them. Development is characterized by a diversification
of social capacities, and we learn to deploy a combination of
both embodied and cognitive skills in a context-sensitive manner
(Fiebich et al., 2016).
This reappraisal of the development of social awareness is
consistent with an ongoing reevaluation of social understanding
in adults. It is already widely accepted that our capacities for
theorizing about and simulating other minds are not mutually
exclusive but complementary (Frith and Frith, 2012), for example
in terms of dual processing (Bohl and van den Bos, 2012). And, as
has been argued by phenomenological, embodied, and enactive
approaches, it makes sense that the mechanisms of reflective
social cognition are in turn complemented by interaction
dynamics and perceptual experience (Wiltshire et al., 2015). In
contrast, it had long been assumed that social understanding
must be mainly cognitive because other minds are fundamentally
unobservable (Premack and Woodruff, 1978), a claim which
follows from the traditional theory that we only perceive physical
properties of the world. However, this position is problematic
because it underestimates the scope of perceptual experience
and is therefore forced to overburden the role of intellectual
activity (Gallagher, 2008). When we attend to how we relate to
other persons in our everyday life, we realize that the ability to
simply perceive others as subjects guided by their own minds
remains our primary means of social understanding and that
uncertainties can often be resolved in interaction (Gallagher,
2012).
This phenomenological insight is particularly evident when
adopting a second-person perspective, that is, when we are
engaged in mutually responsive interaction in which another
person appears as an immediate “you” rather than as a detached
he or she. As long as there is nothing strange about the situation,
it is possible to perceive a large extent of the other’s psychological
states in the ways in which they act in the world and especially in
how they interact with us (Ratcliffe, 2007). In acknowledgment
of ecological theories of perception, this capacity to perceive
the other’s mind without the need for explicit theorizing or
imagining is often referred to as the “direct perception” of other
minds (Froese and Leavens, 2014). As the direct social perception
thesis has become more widely accepted in cognitive science,
the debate has shifted from clarifying the phenomenology to
elucidating its underlying mechanisms (Michael and De Bruin,
2015). Many researchers still appeal to mechanisms of inference
and/or simulation that are restricted to an individual, but there is
also a growing recognition that embodied interaction itself plays
a role in such social perception.
Toward a Relational Hypothesis
We can motivate this interactive approach to the phenomenon
of direct social perception from both phenomenological and
developmental perspectives, which converge on basically the
same relational hypothesis: the conditions underlying social
awareness cannot be reduced to an isolated individual; it is rather
the other’s intentional and attentional engagement with one’s self
that helps to constitute one’s awareness of the other’s presence.
Reddy (2008) has argued for this hypothesis at length from
a developmental perspective. She points out that if the other’s
mindedness is directly expressed in their embodied interaction
with the world, and especially in their engagement with one’s self,
then all an infant needs is a predisposition to attend to and pick
up the other’s embodied manifestations of mentality. And the
infant is surrounded with such manifestations from the moment
of birth, in particular the unavoidable manipulations of its own
body when it is picked up and carried, fed, cleaned, bathed, and
so forth. Accordingly, she contends that infants’ first experience
of others is constituted by being the object of their caretakers’
attention (Reddy, 2003, 2005).
The relational hypothesis has also been defended by
the phenomenological tradition of philosophy, especially by
Merleau-Ponty (1960/1964a,b). He argued that infants’ awareness
of other minds develops from within a dyadic state of
consciousness, and that our most basic awareness of other minds
even as adults is constituted by passive touch. He specifically
focused on touch, rather than other perceptual modalities,
because the experience of touching one’s own body exemplifies
how we can perceive embodiment in both is objective and
subjective aspects: while attending to how my right hand is
touching my left hand I can experience myself as the active
subject of that action, but I can also switch my attention to
the left hand as it is being touched and thereby experience
myself as the passive object of that action. In this way we
have direct experiential insight into how it feels to be the
target of someone’s intentional touching (in this case by
ourselves).1
It is notable that Merleau-Ponty appeals to an element of
passivity in his account of intersubjective experience, despite
his usual emphasis that perceiving is an active process. Similar
to how one needs to adopt a passively receptive attitude to
feel one’s left hand as being intentionally touched by the active
right hand, a moment of passivity in one’s interaction with
another person helps to make the other’s activity appear as
intentionally originating from the other. In other words, by
temporarily withholding one’s self from being the active center
of reference of one’s experience of the interaction one allows
the other’s contribution to become present as originating from
another autonomous center of reference.
1Other perceptual modalities do not offer this possibility, e.g., of directly seeing
myself looking at my own body, which is why they are argued to be secondary.
However, it must be acknowledged that we can nevertheless perceive the presence
of other subjects visually and even do so while they are not attending to us. We
return to the problem of generalizing the capacity of social perception in the section
“discussion.” For the moment we simply note that it is still the case that when one
is aware of being looked at one tends to experience a particularly strong presence
of another subject.
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Miyahara (2015) has identified an unresolved issue in
Merleau-Ponty’s account of passive touch as the foundation of
intersubjectivity. He notes that we can come into tactile contact
with many kinds of objects, and merely undergoing a tactile
sensation is not sufficient by itself to cause a transition to a
conscious experience of another subject’s presence. For example,
if an apple happens to fall on my head while I walk under
an apple tree, I will passively undergo the tactile sensation of
its impact. But that experience is not a case of passive touch:
experiencing a mere tactile impact is not the same as a feeling
of being touched by someone. Miyahara (2015) suggests that a
necessary condition for the latter type of experience is a more
continuous form of actual or potential contact. For example, if
my arm is continuously stroked by a branch of the tree while it is
blown by the wind, I may have the creepy sensation that the tree
is touching me.2
Nevertheless, we suggest that an illusion of passive touch
will normally quickly break down, for example if I occasionally
interrupt my passive mode by actively responding to the
stimulation. This will reveal that the movements of the branch
are not contingent on my actions and are therefore themselves
not susceptible of passive touch. Accordingly, we propose that the
reciprocity of social interaction, for example during coordinated
handshakes, is another essential factor in the constitution of
awareness of other minds. Reciprocity also implies that the
participants of the interaction share their social awareness, such
that one’s awareness of the other is at the same time matched by
the other’s awareness of one’s self, i.e., there is a common sense
that we are aware of each other.
Given these considerations we propose a relational hypothesis
of social perception: one’s awareness of another mind emerges
in a context of co-regulated interaction and is preceded by a
passive period of being the autonomous other’s object of attention.
We set out to empirically evaluate this hypothesis in the tactile
modality because, as we have discussed, this has been argued
to be the primary modality for direct social perception in both
developmental and phenomenological terms. Given that the
hypothesis is sufficiently general so as to be applicable to infants
and adults, we base our analysis on a paradigm involving pairs of
adult participants because this enables us to evaluate subjective
reports of the quality of their experience of each other.
The Perceptual Crossing Paradigm
A popular approach to studying the tactile sensorimotor
interaction dynamics associated with recognition of the presence
of another person was pioneered by Lenay and colleagues (Lenay
et al., 2006; Auvray et al., 2009; Auvray and Rohde, 2012).
This so-called “perceptual crossing” paradigm was designed
to test whether adults are sensitive to the responsiveness of
another’s tactile stimulations under the controlled conditions of
a minimalistic virtual reality environment, an approach which
2This example shows that the direct social perception thesis is not committed to the
infallibility of experience. Even if I have the experience that someone is touching
me, this may actually turn out not to be the case. On the other hand, it is also not
the case that fallibility entails that perceptual experience never directly involves its
object of perception. The details of this philosophical issue go beyond the scope of
this paper (see Beaton, 2013).
in turn was inspired by the double TV monitor paradigm
that Murray and Trevarthen (1985) designed to demonstrate
that infants are sensitive to social contingency during visual
interaction with their mothers. The general aim of these
paradigms is to allow the controlled study of social interaction
dynamics in real time.
In the perceptual crossing paradigm two players in separate
rooms are asked to locate each other in a virtual environment, a
line that is invisible to them, by using a simple haptic interface.
No other form of interaction is possible. They can move their
avatars using a computer mouse and they receive a tactile
stimulation to their hand whenever their avatar overlaps with a
virtual object. There are three objects that can be encountered
by a player: (1) the other player’s avatar, (2) the other avatar’s
“shadow” – an object that simply copies the other avatar’s
movements at a fixed distance, and (3) a static object (see section
“Materials and Methods” for more details). All three objects have
exactly the same size, which means that overlapping with them
gives rise to the same “on” tactile sensation. Nevertheless, the
objects afford different forms of interaction: only two out of the
three can move, and out of these two only the other’s avatar
can respond to being touched because only this situation of
perceptual crossing means that both participants receive tactile
feedback at the same time. In other words, the shadow object
serves as a special kind of distractor because even though it
moves identically to the other participant’s avatar, only the latter
is potentially responsive. Participants were asked to click a button
on the computer mouse to record the moment whenever they
judged that they were currently interacting with the other’s avatar.
They knew that in addition to another’s avatar they could also
encounter two other objects, but they were not informed that
one of those objects copied exactly the movements of the other’s
avatar. No feedback was provided about click correctness.
The original study by Auvray and Rohde (2012) and several
replications found that participants were able to successfully
locate each other in the virtual space, with most clicks being
on target. However, surprisingly, participants seemed unable to
consciously distinguish their partner’s avatar from the moving
distractor object: the probability of clicking after making contact
with the partner was not significantly different from the
probability of clicking after making contact with the other’s
shadow. Instead, the correct social judgments could be explained
by the relative stability of mutual interaction. Since both
participants actively look for each other, they tend to continue
interacting when they happen to make mutual contact, while
tending to move away from overly stable (likely caused by a static
object) and overly unstable (likely caused by a non-responsive
object) situations. The solution to the task, i.e., a participant’s
sensitivity to social contingency, was thus interactively realized
at the collective level of description.
Froese et al. (2014a) implemented a team-based variation
of the perceptual crossing paradigm where the pairs of players
were asked to cooperate. They found that most teams were
successful; on average players were significantly more likely
to click in response to a stimulation from the other’s avatar
than any other object. In contrast to previous studies this
difference remained significant even at the level of individual
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conditional probabilities. They also found that trials in which
both players correctly identified each other led to significantly
higher perceptual clarity ratings than when only one player
clicked correctly or a player clicked wrongly. Such situations
of clear perceptual awareness and joint success tended to be
preceded by elevated levels of turn-taking (TT) interaction, which
was interpreted as confirming the hypothesis by Froese and Di
Paolo (2011) that co-regulation of interaction gives rise to a
distinctively social kind of perceptual experience. Clicks in jointly
successful trials were most likely to occur within seconds of
each other, which is consistent with the possibility that a dyadic
awareness of each other was shared between participants.
This dyadic nature of the interaction was further supported
by a re-analysis of the sensorimotor time series by Zapata-
Fonseca et al. (2016). They revealed that the clustering statistics
(Allan factor) of discrete movement events was characterized
by fractal scaling, which highlights that the social interaction
process operates in a distributed fashion across multiple
timescales. Moreover, the complexity matching, defined as
the interpersonal similarity between these scaling laws of the
clustering statistics, was significantly more pronounced in real
pairs of participants as compared to surrogate dyads. This
confirms the multi-scale distributed character of real-time
social coordination, and extends previous complexity matching
results from dyadic verbal conversations (Abney et al., 2014)
to embodied interaction dynamics. The finding will not come
as a surprise to developmental psychologists who have long
recognized the communicative and dialogical potential of even
basic embodied interaction (Trevarthen, 1979; Tronick, 1989;
Stern, 1998; Reddy, 2008).
A diachronic re-analysis of that original study by Froese
et al. (2014b) confirmed the expected relevance of the perceptual
crossing paradigm for understanding the development of social
perceptual awareness. It seems that the unfamiliar experimental
setup forced the adults to implicitly re-learn the embodied skill
of social perception, which may provide researchers with an
opportunity to study a recapitulation of its original development
in adults. In particular, a trial-by-trial qualitative analysis of
participants’ free-text subjective descriptions turned out to be
roughly consistent with Reddy’s (2003) proposal about the
qualitative stages involved in being the other’s object of attention.
Initially, participants were more likely to report a self-centered
awareness of the other’s presence via being the object of their
attention, such as a feeling of being explored by the other, which
later on became complemented by descriptions of more dyadic
and complex forms of attention, such as exchanging specific
patterns of stimulation and spontaneously adopting roles of
leader and follower. This trial-by-trial process of implicit learning
was accompanied by a general increase in the frequency of
clear perceptual awareness scale (PAS) scores and joint clicking
success.
The diachronic analysis of phenomenological descriptions by
Froese, Iizuka, and Ikegami was consistent with the primacy of
passive touch in that descriptions of the other’s attention to the
self tended to precede more complex forms of social engagement.
However, their qualitative analysis cannot tell us whether the
moment preceding recognition of the other was objectively
characterized by a relative increase in the passive reception of
tactile stimulation caused by the other’s movements. Neither does
it allow us to verify if a longer duration of passive touch as such
entails a clearer awareness of the other’s presence, or whether
coordinated sensorimotor interaction is more important. In this
study we addressed these challenges based on a more refined
analysis of the sensorimotor data generated by that experiment.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
The dataset we re-analyzed was originally reported by Froese et al.
(2014a). We therefore only briefly describe the participants and
the experimental setup as far as it is necessary to understand the
data. Then we introduce the techniques of analysis we applied.
Participants
Participants were healthy volunteers recruited from
acquaintances at the University of Tokyo and at the University
of Osaka (N = 34). There were 25 Japanese nationals, the rest
were from various countries. Six were female. The mean age
was 29 years. Teams of participants were created as volunteers
became available.
The study protocol was approved by the local ethics research
committee of the Graduate School of Information Science
and Technology, University of Osaka, and by the local ethics
research committee of the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences,
University of Tokyo, and has been performed in accordance with
the ethical standards laid down in the Declaration of Helsinki.
All of the participants gave their written informed consent before
taking part in the study.
Experimental Setup
In Froese et al.’s (2014a) version of the perceptual crossing
paradigm, two adults are placed in distinct locations such that
they cannot perceive each other; their sight is blocked and
they wear noise-cancelling headphones (Figure 1). Their only
manner of making contact is via a simple interface consisting of
a trackball that records horizontal movements and a hand-held
vibration motor that is either on or off. The trackball is
operated with the dominant hand while the motor is held in the
other hand. Their movements control the motions of an avatar
located in an invisible 1D virtual environment (Figure 2). The
motor continuously vibrates whenever their avatar overlaps with
another object in the virtual space. Position and sensor data were
recorded every 10 ms (100 Hz).
The task given to pairs of players was to form a team and
to help each other to find each other in the virtual space. They
are to click once using the trackball (and only once per trial) in
order to signal to the experimenters when they become aware of
interacting with the other player; the other player is not aware of
the click. No feedback is provided during the experiment. Each
pair can interact in a sequence of 15 trials, each with a duration of
60 s. After each trial the experience of the players is evaluated in
several ways if they happened to click in that trial. In particular,
they were asked to rate the clarity of their experience of the
other’s presence at the moment of their click on the basis of a
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 4 October 2017 | Volume 8 | Article 1778
fpsyg-08-01778 October 11, 2017 Time: 18:24 # 5
Kojima et al. Transition to Conscious Social Perception
FIGURE 1 | Experimental setup of perceptual crossing paradigm. The two participants can only engage with each other via a human–computer interface that
reduces their scope for embodied interaction to a minimum of translational movement and binary tactile sensation. Each player’s interface consists of two parts: a
trackball that controls the linear displacement of their virtual avatar, and a hand-held haptic feedback device that vibrates at a constant frequency for as long as a
player’s avatar overlaps with another virtual object and remains off otherwise. Three small lights on each desk signal the start, halftime (30 s), and completion of each
60-s trial. Figure originally published in Froese et al. (2014a).
FIGURE 2 | Virtual environment of perceptual crossing paradigm. Players Pa and Pb are virtually embodied as “avatars” on a line that wraps around after 600 units
of space. This virtual space is invisible to the participants. Each avatar consists of a binary contact sensor and a body object. Unbeknownst to the players a
“shadow” object is attached to each avatar body at a fixed distance of 150 units. There are also two static objects, one for each player. All objects are four units long
and can therefore only be distinguished interactively in terms of their qualitatively different affordances for tactile engagement. No other forms of interaction were
possible. Figure originally published in Froese et al. (2014a).
social version of the PAS, based on the PAS that was proposed
by Ramsøy and Overgaard (2004). In this scale 1 means having
had no experience, 2 means having had an ambiguous experience,
3 means having had an almost clear experience, and 4 means
having had a clear experience (Table 1).
Analysis of Sensorimotor Trajectories
First, we replicated and extended previous work on measuring
the amount of interpersonal coordination that precedes clicks.
The degree of TT was calculated following the method
proposed by Froese et al. (2014a). At each time step we classified
the state of each player’s behavior in binary terms as either
moving (1) or non-moving (0) by evaluating his or her trackball
movement (we will refer to these binary movement time series
as B1 and B2 for participants Pa and Pb, respectively). Movement
was considered to have taken place whenever the change in avatar
position dx from one time step to the next was bigger than an 8th
of the avatar’s length (i.e., 4/8 = 0.5 so that if dx > 0.5, 1, else 0).
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TABLE 1 | Froese et al.’s (2014a) social version of the perceptual awareness scale
(PAS) adapted from the PAS by Ramsøy and Overgaard (2004).
PAS Experience of other’s presence
1 No experience
2 Ambiguous experience
3 Almost clear experience
4 Clear experience
Since avatar positions tend to fluctuate during a player’s “turn” we
chose to set a lower limit to the duration of movement pauses so
as not to accidentally end up with a turn being divided into micro-
turns. Thus, we only set movements to 0 if there was no motion
over at least 50 consecutive time steps (500 ms), otherwise they
remain set to 1.
In order to determine the differences between players’ activity
we applied the logical “Not-And” operator to their movement
time series, which resulted in a time series of activity differences D
(i.e., D= B1 Not-And B2). Then, we assigned to each participant
their active contribution of this exchange by applying the logical
“And” operator and summing the result [i.e., C1 = sum(B1
And D); C2 = sum(B2 And D)]. The overall TT performance
for a given time period was then calculated by multiplying
the player’s active contributions. This multiplication means that
one-sided situations, in which one player is continuously active
while the other is continuously passive, get low TT scores.
Finally, we normalized the outcome such that the TT score
TT= (4 ∗ C1 ∗ C2)/T2, where T is the number of time steps. The
range of TT is therefore [0, 1], with 0 representing a complete
absence of TT interactions and 1 representing a perfect exchange
of periods of activity and passivity between the subjects. We
analyzed the TT in the 10 s preceding a click (or correspondingly
less when the click occurred within the first 10 s of a trial).
The measure of TT interaction that was proposed by Froese
et al. (2014a) can tell us whether players were exchanging periods
of activity and passivity in an orderly manner, but it does not say
much about the similarity of the patterns of activity that were
being exchanged. Given that interpersonal synchrony is widely
considered to reflect psychological connectedness, we applied
measures of movement synchrony, namely cross-correlation
(CC) and windowed cross-lagged regression (WCLR). CC is a
common measure but can be confounded by auto-correlation,
which may lead to inflated measures of interpersonal synchrony,
a problem which is avoided by WCLR (Altmann, 2011). High
levels of synchrony can mean that both players are moving
similarly at the same time or with a lag. We analyzed periods
of 10 s with a time lag in the range of [−5, 5] seconds, which
means that clicks occurring during the first 15 s of a trial were
excluded from CC and WCLR analysis. In total, 28 clicks had
to be excluded. We also used WCLR to calculate the windowed
time delay yielding the largest CC value, which gives an indication
of the most relevant timescales in which synchrony can be
measured.
Second, we looked more specifically at the influence of
players’ movements on each other’s tactile sensations preceding
a click using a measure known as local transfer entropy (TE).
This analysis of the whole sensorimotor loop is a significant
methodological advance because previous time series analyses
of perceptual crossing have only focused on movement by
itself, thus leaving the interdependency between movement and
sensation underlying meaningful perception (Noë, 2004; Mossio
and Taraborelli, 2008) unexamined. TE was originally proposed
by Schreiber (2000), and this measure can capture the directional
influence from one time series to the other time series. This TE
can be also formulated in temporally local form (Lizier et al.,
2008), which allows us to calculate TE for specific segments of
a time series.
Transfer entropy uses a joint probability distribution from two
time series, and to calculate this distribution function empirically
from the time series, we need to discretize the time series. The
simplest way is to convert the movement time series to a binary
sequence is in terms of the directional change of movement,
i.e., we label the point in time as a state 1 when it changes,
otherwise we turn it into a state 0. The sensory time series was
also converted to a binary sequence, i.e., when the haptic feedback
turns on or off we label the point in time as a state 1, otherwise it
is set to 0 to mark the absence of a change in sensor state. In order
to determine the most important timescale of the time series, first
we calculated TE by utilizing the whole trial while adjusting the
down-sampling rate. We found there was a peak of TE around
50 ms from the movement data to the sensory input data. We
therefore took 50 ms as the characteristic timescale and used it
for the further analysis of the local TE.
Given that we are interested in determining the sensorimotor
signature of social awareness, we related these objective measures
with the subjective PAS ratings of the clarity of the other’s
presence. In particular, we excluded clicks that were not reported
to have been associated with an experience (i.e., PAS 1 or no
PAS report), and restricted the data to ambiguous, almost clear,
and clear experiences (i.e., PAS 2, 3, and 4, respectively). In
addition, we did not further discriminate between the clicks that
are associated with these conscious reports in terms of their
objective correctness since we were interested in studying the
general conditions of the transition to a social experience rather
than to a veridical social experience per se. The final dataset
consisted of 101, 122, and 143 clicks associated with reports of
a PAS score of 2, 3, and 4, respectively. Out of these 366 clicks 321
correctly identified the other’s avatar.
Statistical Analysis
In order to analyze the relationship between the PAS and the
movement coordination measures (TT, CC, and WCLR), first
we averaged those movement measures with the same PAS, and
applied one-way ANOVA followed by post hoc Bonferroni test.
In the analysis of local TE, we used Welch’s t-test to examine
whether the average TE were different before and after a click.
RESULTS
Players’ activity during a typical trial is shown in Figure 3. Note
the extended period of interpersonal interaction in the first half of
the trial, followed by nearly instantaneous clicks by both players.
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This is followed by disengagement, then a short interaction with
their respective static objects, and finally re-engagement just
before the end of the trial.
Qualitative Analysis of Movement
Coordination
We can use the example trial shown in Figure 3 to illustrate
the CC and WCLR measures (Figure 4). It can be seen that
CC greatly overestimates the amount of movement synchrony,
while WCLR picks out only a few temporal regions. For example,
there is a bright blue patch from x = 15 to 20 s for time lags of
around −3 s. This tells us that during the preceding 10 s periods,
starting from 5 to 15 s and ending during the period of 10–20 s
of that trial, player Pb leads Pa with a delay of around 3 s. If we
check this result against what is happening during that time in
Figure 3, we can see that indeed player Pb (blue line) leads Pa
(red line) beginning around 8 s by inducing the latter to also start
oscillating. In the 10 s preceding the clicks, Figure 3 shows that
the direction of influence has become reversed, with Pa staring to
oscillate from around 25 s and then pausing, while Pb continues
to oscillate until pausing around 30 s. If we compare this with
Figure 4, we see some bright blue bands following the clicks
for time lags of around 2 s, which suggests that in the seconds
preceding the clicks Pa’s behavior leads Pb’s behavior.
Nevertheless, it can also be observed that the WCLR method
may be confounded when the players happen to move similarly
but without interacting directly. For example, it turns out that
the highest values in Figure 4 are given for the period from
around x = 42 to 50 s for lag times of around 0.5 s, even
though Figure 3 reveals that in the corresponding period starting
from 32 s onward the players had already separated and just
happened to move in roughly similar ways, with Pa slightly
leading Pb but without direction interaction. However, we do not
arbitrarily want to exclude such cases of behavioral coordination
because they may still tell us something meaningful about the
quality of the interaction. After all, one possible reason why
these two players continued to move similarly even after spatially
disengaging is that they had already become entrained during the
first half of the trial.
We note that TT interaction and synchrony can both give high
values for a trial when the players exchange periods of activity and
passivity whereby that activity is similar in form, too. But they
can also be mutually dissociated in other cases. As illustrated in
Figure 5, players can exchange periods of activity and passivity
whereby that activity itself does not have much resemblance (high
TT and low WCLR), and players can greatly overlap in their
activity but still share a lot of similarity in their movements (low
TT and high WCLR). Here we applied the measures to the 10 s
preceding a click, and we calculated the WCLR value to be the
maximum value from a range of window time lags [−5 s, 5 s].
Quantitative Analysis of Movement
Coordination
Turn–taking interaction and movement synchrony could
spontaneously emerge from the interaction dynamics without
necessitating any explicit intention to coordinate behaviors or
awareness that this is in fact occurring (Froese et al., 2012). In
other words, conscious experience of social interaction cannot be
reduced to objective measures of coordination; both subjective
and objective aspects must be taken into account in an integrated
manner.
Here, we compared each movement coordination measures
with different PAS ratings (CC: 0.27 ± 0.01, 0.30 ± 0.01,
0.31 ± 0.01; WCLR: 0.084 ± 0.005, 0.095 ± 0.005, 0.11 ± 0.01;
and TT: 0.15 ± 0.01, 0.18 ± 0.02, 0.23 ± 0.01, with PAS 2,
3, and 4, respectively), and we found that there was difference
among different PAS ratings for all the objective measures
(ANOVA, F(2,337) = 4.969, p < 0.01, F(2,337) = 3.792,
p = 0.024, and F(2,364) = 8.178, p < 0.001 for CC, WCLR,
and TT, respectively). Especially we found that all movement
coordination measures accompanying with PAS 4 were higher
than with PAS 2 (t(225) = 3.160, p < 0.0.01, t(225) = 2.728,
p = 0.021, t(242) = 4.055, p < 0.001 for CC, WCLR, and TT,
respectively, with Bonferroni correction) (Figure 6).
This is an indication that these measures are characterizing
some part of the sensorimotor interaction signature of a clear
experience of the other’s presence. This seems to suggest
that elevated levels of TT and movement synchrony are a
common feature of the transition to social awareness during
interactions.
Timescales of Movement Coordination
In order to learn more about the timescales in which synchrony
of movements is most pronounced, we used WCLR to calculate
the delay giving the highest CC value for each trial. Since here
we were not interested in which of the two players was leading
the interaction, we took the absolute value of the lag times.
We related these values with players’ PAS ratings to determine
whether some timescales are more relevant for explaining a
clearer experience of the other’s presence (Figure 7). If Miyahara
(2015) is correct in suggesting that a continuous possibility of
passive touch is essential for perceiving the presence of the other,
clearer awareness should presumably be correlated with a longer
timescale of interaction.
Averaged lag time with each PAS rating were evaluated as
2.7 ± 0.1, 2.5 ± 0.1, and 3.0 ± 0.1 s. We found that the average
lag time was significantly different among different PAS ratings
[F(2,337) = 4.395, p = 0.013], and especially we found that
the lag time with PAS 4 was significantly longer than that with
PAS 3 [t(240) = 2.915, p = 0.012, with Bonferroni correction].
Those findings suggest that phenomenologically more salient
forms of movement synchrony are based on a longer timescale
of interaction.
Analysis of Direction of Influence
We used local TE to quantify directions of influence before and
after a click at different timescales (a period of 10, 5, and 1 s before
a click and 1, 5, and 10 s after a click). The periods of 1 and 10 s
were chosen to coincide with the two cognitive scales of Varela’s
(1999) three scales of duration of the temporal horizon: (1) basic
or elementary neural events (the “1/10” scale); (2) relaxation
time for large-scale neural integration of cognitive or perceptual
acts (the “1” scale); and (3) descriptive-narrative assessments of
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FIGURE 3 | Example of time course of an illustrative trial (E1T1). Thick red and blue lines show the change in position of the avatars of players Pa and Pb, and red
and blue dotted lines trace their “shadow” objects. Horizontal lines at y = –150, 150 correspond to the position of the player-specific static objects. Red and blue
arrows indicate the time of clicking by Pa and Pb, which occurred practically instantaneously (within 0.05 s). After the trial players Pa and Pb reported that their
experience of the other’s presence at the moment of the click consisted in a “vague impression” (PAS 2) and a “clear experience” (PAS 4), respectively.
FIGURE 4 | Heat maps of cross correlation (CC, left) and WCLR (right) for an illustrative trial (E1T1). Measures are applied to periods of 10 s. The x-axis corresponds
to the end point of the time window. The y-axis corresponds to the length of the windowed time lag; a positive sign means that behavior of participant Pa can explain
that of Pb after the given delay (conversely, a negative sign means that the direction of influence instead goes from Pb to Pa). Thus, it starts at 15 s because a lag
time of 5 s means that we compare Pa’s activity from 0 to 10 s with Pb’s activity from 5 to 15 s (or vice versa for a lag time of –5 s). The vertical lines after 30 s
represent the nearly instantaneous moment of clicking by both players.
the situation (the “10” scale). The 5 s scale was chosen as an
intermediate scale that is consistent with the lag times used for
the synchrony analyses. It is also of interest as an expression of
cognitive events taking place at the “1” scale: spontaneous speech
in many languages is organized such that utterances last 2–3 s and
short intentional movements (such as self-initiated arm motion)
are embedded within windows of this duration (Varela, 1999). We
return to this point in the discussion.
We denote S1 as the “self ’s” sensor time series and S2 as
the “other’s” sensor time series. Self and other are determined
relative to the player who made the click. Who clicks first was
not considered here. When one player touches the other, both
sensors get activated at the same time (i.e., S1 = S2). They are
only different (i.e., S1 6= S2) when either player touches the
static objects or the shadows. Yet even though this means that
Figures 8, 9 are expected to return similar values for situations
of perceptual crossing, we separate M1/2 → S1 (Figure 8) and
M1/2 → S2 (Figure 9) for the sake of clarifying active/passive
touch differences.
In support of the hypothesis of passive touch we found that the
transition to perception of the other’s presence was characterized
by passively received tactile stimulation (Figure 8). In general,
there tends to be more influence from the other’s movements
(M2) on the self ’s sensations (S1) compared with the influence
of the self ’s movements (M1). However, we did not find a
continuous period of passive touch, a result that is consistent
with our finding that significant lag times are <3 s. A statistically
significant heightened influence of M2 on S1 was only observed
in the second immediately before the click and only for high PAS
ratings [t(214.0) = 2.83, p < 0.01, t(279.9) = 3.54, p < 0.001 for
PAS 3 and 4, correspondingly).
This pattern is reversed after the click: moments of awareness
rated as PAS 3 and 4 are followed by heightened influence of
the self ’s movements on the self ’s sensations (i.e., comparatively
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 8 October 2017 | Volume 8 | Article 1778
fpsyg-08-01778 October 11, 2017 Time: 18:24 # 9
Kojima et al. Transition to Conscious Social Perception
FIGURE 5 | Illustrative comparison between turn–taking (TT) and WCLR measures. For clarity we only plot the change in position of the avatars of players Pa and Pb
(blue and red lines). Arrows mark the moment of player Pa’s click. Taking turns by exchanging periods of movement and passivity does not entail a similarity between
players’ movement patterns (left, E7T6), and a similarity between players’ movement patterns does not entail a TT interaction (right, E17T15). The values for TT and
WCLR for the 10 s before Pa’s click (shaded regions) are 0.49 and 0.015 for the example on the left and 0.0 and 0.18 for the example on the right, respectively. The
lag times that yielded these maximum WCLR values were –4.4 (left) and –2.8 s (right).
FIGURE 6 | Three measures of interpersonal movement coordination and the clarity of the other’s presence (PAS). We averaged the three measures of interpersonal
movement coordination, CC (CC, left), WCLR (middle), and TT (right) scores for each PAS rating. The measures were applied to the 10 s preceding a click.
∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗∗p < 0.001 (with Bonferroni correction).
more TE from M1 to S1 compared to M2 to S1). Moreover,
this difference in influence only becomes significant after a few
seconds and remains so until at least 10 s [t(274.8) = 5.16,
p < 10−6, t(263.2) = 4.47, p < 10−4, for 5 and 10 s with PAS
4, respectively).
Analysis of Switch from Passive to Active
Touch
This post-click reversal in the flow of influences was unexpected.
We considered two plausible explanations. On the one hand,
this period of self-generated activity could be an example
of reciprocity, in which the self now tries to make its
presence clear to the other by providing them with an
opportunity for undergoing passive stimulation in return,
which would incidentally also stimulate the self ’s own sensor
due to the situation of perceptual crossing. However, an
alternative possibility, which is more in line with the illustrative
trial shown Figure 3, is that a click marks the end of a
bout of close interaction followed by a period of temporary
disengagement, in which the movements of the other participant
play only a diminished role for the self ’s sensations. We
therefore redid the analysis shown in Figure 8, but this time
focusing on the TE from the self to the other’s sensations.
The aim is to verify if the self ’s movements comparatively
increase their influence on the other’s sensations or not
(Figure 9).
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FIGURE 7 | The timescale at which movement imitation is most pronounced
(WCLR lag) and the clarity of other’s presence (PAS). We calculated the size of
the windowed time lag yielding the maximum value for WCLR and averaged it
over the same ratings of clarity of other’s presence (PAS). ∗p < 0.05 (with
Bonferroni correction).
We found that in the periods leading up the self ’s click
the other’s movements dominated the other’s own sensations
(M2→ S2), which is to be expected if the self is mostly passive
during the transition to social awareness (M1) and the other is
actively moving (M2). After a click the situation becomes more
complex. Following moments of clear awareness (PAS 4) the
other’s sensations are more influenced by the self ’s movements
(M1→ S2), and significantly so in the longer post-click periods
[t(276.8) = 3.93, p < 0.001, t(263.6) = 3.26, p < 0.01, for 5
and 10 s with PAS 4, respectively). This is consistent with the
idea that the self returns the feeling of passive touch to the
other, which from the self ’s perspective involves a transition from
passive to active touch, but this possibility is more typical for clear
awareness. After less clear experiences (PAS 2 and 3) there tends
to be a stronger influence from the other’s movements to other’s
own sensations, a trend especially notable for the immediate
post-click period (1 and 5 s) and for the least clear experience
(PAS 2). This is consistent with the idea that the self disengages
from its interaction with the other after making a click, thereby
leaving the other alone to generate their own sensations, but this
decoupling is more typical for when the other’s presence was not
experienced sufficiently clearly.
Both of these situations can be confirmed in Figure 3, where
the player who first disengages after the clicks (Pa) was also the
one who gave a PAS score of only 2, while the other player
who apparently would have continued interacting gave a PAS
score of 4. These differences in the self ’s awareness-dependent
post-click behavior, namely the transition from passive to active
touch compared with relative disengagement, deserve attention
in future studies.
DISCUSSION
We confirmed Froese and Di Paolo’s (2011) hypothesis that
real-time co-regulation of interaction, as measured by TT and
movement synchrony, is higher when there is clearer awareness
of the other’s presence as measured by PAS ratings. However,
although movement synchrony was significant, the relationship
between PAS ratings and the movement synchrony was not
particularly conspicuous, which suggests that other factors are in
play as well. We therefore looked at the role of timescales. We
found that the duration of an interaction makes a difference for
how it is experienced, because the time lags involved in the most
pronounced periods of synchrony were different among different
awareness ratings.
We then looked at how participants influenced each other’s
sensations via their movements. The results of the TE analysis
are consistent with the importance of short timescales. Passive
stimulation first becomes notable around 5 s before a click, but
only becomes significant in the second before the click. To be
fair, this relative reduction in self-generated stimulation may
be partially due to the fact that participants often paused their
movements in order click. However, even so this pausing does
not explain a corresponding increase in influence from the other’s
actions to one’s sensations (for instance, the other player could
pause as well or disengage altogether). More importantly, it
does not explain why the extent to which this passively received
stimulation exceeded self-generated stimulation was positively
correlated with the reported clarity of the other’s presence. Also,
in the original perceptual crossing experiment by Auvray et al.
(2009) they reported that the most common cue preceding clicks
was “changes in the stimulation without moving” and this is
consistent with our result.
We can better make sense of this positive correlation by
considering that if one feels a sensation while moving, it is not
clear whether this sensation was caused by one’s own or by
the other’s movement. However, if one feels a new sensation
without moving, then one cannot have caused the sensation.
Moreover, the structure of the other’s autonomously generated
movements should be more apparent. For example, if I feel a
repeated, irregular and yet contingent, i.e., not random, series of
sensations it is most likely generated by the other (Lenay et al.,
2011). We therefore suggest that participants remained passive
during their transition to social perception because this permitted
the presence of the other to be most clearly experienced in terms
of the other’s autonomous movements being applied to one’s self.
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FIGURE 8 | Average local TE to the self’s sensations before and after clicks. We analyzed periods of 10, 5, and 1 s before a click and 1, 5, and 10 s after a click.
Yellow and green bars indicate how much the movements made by the self (M1), i.e., the player who made the click, and by the other player (M2) contributed to the
self ’s tactile stimulation (S1), respectively. Error bars represent standard error; significance was calculated using the Welch’s t-test. ∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01,
∗∗∗p < 0.001.
FIGURE 9 | Average local TE to the other’s sensations before and after clicks. We analyzed periods of 10, 5, and 1 s before a click and 1, 5, and 10 s after a click.
Yellow and green bars indicate how much the movements made by the self (M1), i.e., the player who made the click, and by the other player (M2) contributed to the
other’s tactile stimulation (S2), respectively. Error bars represent standard error; significance was calculated using the Welch’s t-test. ∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01,
∗∗∗p < 0.001.
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However, in contrast to our expectations, we did not find
that a continuous feeling of passive touch is essential, at
least not if we interpret continuity to imply periods of more
than just a few seconds. The average lag time characteristic
of the most pronounced periods of synchrony does not go
beyond Varela’s (1999) “1 s” timescale, according to which an
integrated cognitive–perceptual act tends to have a maximum
duration of 2–3 s. Similarly, passive touch was only found
to be statistically significant within one second before a click.
Nevertheless, Miyahara’s (2015) speculation that an essential
difference between the intersubjective phenomenon of passive
touch and other passive tactile encounters resides in the temporal
dimension may still be correct. Specifically, he claims: “To
experience the other body as really involving the other agent,
we must experience it as an actual or potential constituent
of passive experience in an ongoing, continuous manner”
(p. 31).
And indeed the final moment of clear passive touch was
embedded within a longer coordination, in which either
player could always potentially be the receiver of passive
touch and which may already have included several actual
instances of passive touch in the form of TT. Presumably
this preceding period of co-regulation ensures the success
of interactively coordinated symmetry breaking into the
complementary roles required for passive touch. Agent-
based models confirm that TT and movement synchrony
can be analyzed as spontaneous cooperative and co-creative
processes, and they indicate that changes in the extent of mutual
predictability might play a role in the coordinated timing of
role switching (Ikegami and Iizuka, 2007). Future studies could
try to analyze changes in relative predictability using human
data.
One limitation of the current study is that it was only
applied to adult interactions. Nevertheless, we suggest that
our methods could be applied to sensorimotor data from
developmental studies with the aim of analyzing preverbal
infants’ initial transitions to social awareness. The results are
at least consistent with the theory that infants’ first form of
primitive social awareness is based on their being the object
of other’s attention. They also support the claim that passive
touch continues to be operational in adulthood within a larger
repertoire of social skills. For example, we cannot tickle ourselves
but depend on others to tickle us, so there may still be something
special about passive touch even in adulthood. Nevertheless, the
relative importance of passive touch for adult social perception
is debatable. Even if infants’ social perception is primarily
constituted in this relational manner in the tactile modality, as
adults we can perceive others as subjects in their own right
without being touched by them and without even being the
object of their attention. How passive touch could develop
into this more generalized capacity is an interesting open
problem.
We speculate that once infants develop their visual awareness
they tend to experience themselves as being the object of the
other’s attention in both the tactile and the visual modality,
and that this repeated multimodal association enables them to
perceive the other’s presence even when being their object of
attention in the visual modality alone. The same may apply to
other modalities, such as audition. Presumably, the subsequent
development of the capacity for joint attention, which makes
infants aware that the other’s attention can also be directed at
other objects than the self eventually enables them to perceive
the presence of others by only perceiving their engagement
with the rest of the world in general. A recent extension of
the perceptual crossing paradigm designed to investigate the
interaction dynamics underlying mutual awareness of a shared
object (Deschamps et al., 2016) could perhaps be adapted to
evaluate these ideas in an experimental manner.
CONCLUSION
Developmental and phenomenological approaches to embodied
cognition have converged on the relational hypothesis that being
the other’s object of attention, as exemplified by the phenomenon
of passive touch, is the most basic form of awareness of
other minds. We evaluated this hypothesis quantitatively by re-
analyzing the sensorimotor time series of a perceptual crossing
experiment, in which pairs of players were tasked to cooperatively
coordinate their movements so as to locate each other in a
minimal virtual environment using haptic interfaces, and to
identify and subjectively evaluate the moment they became aware
of the other’s presence.
We found that the transition to clear awareness of the other’s
presence coincides with pronounced moments of passive touch.
To our knowledge this is the first time that the relational
hypothesis has been supported with quantitative results. In
addition, our time series analysis enabled us to extend this
hypothesis into new directions. We proposed that elevated
levels of sensorimotor coordination enhance one’s awareness of
being the other’s object of attention. On our view, a salient
moment of passive touch depends on spontaneous symmetry
breaking of interpersonal movement coordination and therefore
emerges out of a more extended co-regulation of behaviors.
This makes reciprocity another essential factor in our account.
We suggest that developmental and phenomenological versions
of the relational hypothesis have underestimated the role of
mutuality, as exemplified by the surprising finding that the
clearest social experience tends to be associated with players
switching roles in a transition from passive to active touch such
that one individual’s awareness of the other transforms into a
dyadic awareness of each other.
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